We analyse the Tangle -a DAG-valued stochastic process where new vertices get attached to the graph at Poissonian times, and the attachment's locations are chosen by means of random walks on that graph. We prove existence of ("almost symmetric") Nash equilibria for the system where a part of players tries to optimize their attachment strategies. Then, we also present simulations that show that the "selfish" players will nevertheless cooperate with the network by choosing attachment strategies that are similar to the default one.
Introduction and description of the model
In this paper we study the Tangle, a stochastic process on the space of (rooted) Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). This process "grows" in time, in the sense that new vertices are attached to the graph according to a Poissonian clock, but no vertices/edges are ever deleted. When that clock rings, a new vertex appears and attaches itself to locations that are chosen with the help of certain random walks on the state of the process in the recent past (this is to model the network propagation delays); these random walks therefore play the key role in the model.
Random walks on random graphs can be thought of as a particular case of Random Walks in Random Environments: here, the transition probabilities are functions of the graph only, i.e., there are no additional variables (such as "weights" etc.) attached to the vertices and/or edges of the graph. Still, this subject is very broad, and one can find many related works in the literature. One can mention the internal DLA models (e.g. [11] and references therein), random walks on Erdös-Rényi graphs [5, 11] , or (which most closely resembles the model of this paper) random walks on the preferential attachment graphs [4] .
The motivation for studying the particular model of this paper stems from the fact that its application is found in the IOTA cryptocurrency [1, 17] , which uses (nontrivial) DAGs as the primary ledger for the transactions' data. This is different from "traditional" cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, where that data is stored in a sequence of blocks 1 , also known as blockchain. An important observation, which motivates the use of more general DAGs instead of blockchains is that the latter scales poorly: when the network is large, it is difficult for it to achieve consensus on which blocks are "valid" in the situations when the new blocks come frequently.
We also cite [2, 3, 14, 18] which deal with other approaches to using DAGs as distributed ledgers.
In the following we introduce the mathematical model describing the Tangle [17] . Let card(A) stand for the cardinality of (multi)set A. For an oriented graph T = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the multiset of edges, and v ∈ V , we denote by deg in (v) = card{e = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ E : u 2 = v}, deg out (v) = card{e = (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ E : u 1 = v} the "ingoing" and "outgoing" degrees of the vertex v (counting the multiple edges). For u, v ∈ V , we say that u approves v, if (u, v) ∈ E. We use the notation A(u) for the set of the vertices approved by u. We say that u ∈ V references or indirectly approves v ∈ V if there is a sequence of sites u = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k = v such that x j ∈ A(x j−1 ) for all j = 1, . . . , k, i.e., there is a directed path from u to v. If deg in (w) = 0 (i.e., there are no edges pointing to w), then we say that w ∈ V is a tip.
Let G be the set of all Directed Acyclic Graphs (also known as DAGs, that is, oriented graphs without cycles) G = (V, E) with the following properties:
• the graph G is finite and the multiplicity of any edge is at most two (i.e., there are at most two edges linking the same vertices);
• there is a distinguished vertex ℘ ∈ V such that deg out (v) = 2 for all v ∈ V \{℘}, and deg out (℘) = 0 (this vertex ℘ is called the genesis);
• any v ∈ V such that v = ℘ references ℘; that is, there is an oriented path 2 from v to ℘ (one can say that the graph is connected towards ℘).
We now describe the tangle as a continuous-time Markov process on the space G.
The state of the tangle at time t ≥ 0 is a DAG T (t) = (V T (t), E T (t)), where V T (t) is the set of vertices and E T (t) is the multiset of directed edges at time t. The process' dynamics is described in the following way:
• First, the initial state of the process is defined by V T (0) = ℘, E T (0) = ∅.
• The tangle grows with time, that is,
• For a fixed parameter λ > 0, there is a Poisson process of incoming transactions; these transactions then become the vertices of the tangle.
• Each incoming transaction chooses 3 two vertices v and v (which, in general, may coincide), and we add two oriented edges from v to v and v . We say in this case that this new transaction was attached to v and v (equivalently, v approves v and v ).
• Specifically, if a new transaction v arrived at time t , then V T (t +) = V T (t )∪{v},
Let us write
for the "past" and the "future" with respect to x (at time t). In other words, the above introduces a partial order structure on the tangle. Observe that, if t 0 is the 2 not necessarily unique 3 the precise way of how it does that will be described below time moment when x was attached to the tangle, then P (t) (x) = P (t 0 ) (x) for all t ≥ t 0 . We also define the cumulative weight H (t)
x of the vertex x at time t by
that is, the cumulative weight of x is one (its "own weight") plus the number of vertices that reference it. Observe that, for any t > 0, if y approves x then H (t)
x − H (t) y ≥ 1, and the inequality is strict if and only if there are vertices different from y which also approve x. Also, clearly, the cumulative weight of any tip is equal to 1.
There is some data associated to each vertex (transaction), created at the moment when that transaction was attached to the tangle. The precise nature of that data is not relevant for the purposes of this paper, so we assume that it is an element of some (unspecified, but finite) set D; what is important, however, is that there is a natural way to say if the set of vertices is consistent with respect to the data they contain 4 . When it is necessary to emphasize that the vertices of G ∈ G contain some data, we consider the marked DAG
We define G [d] to be the set of all marked DAGs (G, d), where G ∈ G.
Attachment strategies
There is one very important thing that has not been explained, namely: how does the newly arrived transaction choose the two vertices in the tangle which it will approve, i.e., what is the attachment strategy? Notice that, in principle, it would be good if the new transactions always prefer to select tips as attachment places, since this way more transactions would be "confirmed". In any case, it is quite clear that the appropriate choice of the attachment strategy is essential for the correct functioning (whatever this could mean) of the system. Now, we describe a possible choice of the default attachment strategy, used to determine where the incoming transaction will be attached. It is also known as the default tip selection algorithm, since, in order to reference more transactions, one should always try to approve tips.
Let us denote by L(t) the set of all vertices that are tips at time t, and let L(t) = card(L(t)). To model the network propagation delays, we introduce a parameter h > 0, and assume that at time t only T (t − h) is known to the entity that issued the incoming transaction. We then define the tip-selecting random walk, in the following way. It depends on a nonnegative parameter q (the backtracking probability) and
on a function f . The initial state of the random walk is the genesis ℘ (although in practical implementations one may start it in some place closer to the tips), and it is stopped upon hitting the set L(t − h) (it is important to observe that v ∈ L(t − h) does not necessarily mean that v is still a tip at time t). Let f : R + → R + be a monotone non-increasing function. The transition probabilities of the walkers are defined in the following way: the walk backtracks (i.e., jumps to a randomly chosen site it approves) with probability q ∈ [0, 1/2); if y approves x = ℘ (y x), then the transition probability P (f )
(for x = ℘ we define the transition probabilities as above, but with q = 0). In what follows, we will mostly assume that f (s) = exp(−αs) for some α ≥ 0. We use the notation P (α) for the transition probabilities in this case. Intuitively, the smaller is the value of α, the more random the walk is 5 . It is worth observing that the case q = 0 and α → ∞ corresponds to the GHOST protocol (more precisely, to the obvious generalization of the GHOST protocol for the case when a tree is substituted by a DAG) of [19] . Now, to select two tips w 1,2 where our transaction will be attached, just run two independent random walks as above, and stop then on the first hitting of L(t − h). One can also require that w 1 should be different from w 2 ; for that, one may re-run the second random walk in the case its exit point happened to be the same as that of the first random walk. Observe that (T (t), t ≥ 0) is a continuous-time transient Markov process on G; since the state space is quite large, it is difficult to analyse this process. In particular, for a fixed time t, it is not easy to study the above random walk since it takes place on a random graph, e.g., can be viewed as a random walk in a random environment; it is common knowledge that random walks in random environments are notoriously hard to deal with.
We say that a transaction is confirmed with confidence γ 0 (where γ 0 is some predefined number, close to 1), if, with probability at least γ 0 , the large-α random walk ends in a tip which references that transaction. It may happen that a transaction We believe that the following statement holds true; however, we have only a convincing heuristical argument in its favor, not a rigorous proof. In any case, it is only of theoretical interest, since, as explained below, in practice we will find ourselves in the situation where P[U] = 0. We therefore state it as Conjecture 1.1. It holds that
Explanation. First of all, it should be true that P[U] ∈ {0, 1} since U is a tail event with respect to the natural filtration; however, it does not seem to be very easy to prove the 0-1 law in this context (recall that we are dealing with a transient Markov process on an infinite state space). Next, consider a tip v 0 which got attached to the tangle at time t 0 , and assume that it is still a tip at time t t 0 ; also, assume that, among all tips, v 0 is "closest" (in some suitable sense) to the genesis. Let us now think of the following question: what is the probability that v 0 will still be a tip at time t + 1?
Look at Figure 1 : during the time interval [t, t + 1], O(1) new particles will arrive, and the corresponding walks will travel from the genesis ℘ looking for tips. Each of these walks will have to cross the dotted vertical segment on the picture, and with positive probability at least one of them will pass through w 0 , one of the vertices approved by v 0 . Assume that w 0 was already confirmed (i.e., connected to the right end of the tangle via some other transaction u 0 that approves w 0 ). Then, it is clear (but not easy to prove!) that the cumulative weight of both u 0 and w 0 should be O(t), and so, when in w 0 , the walk will jump to the tip v 0 with probability f (O(t)).
This suggests that the probability that v 0 ∈ L(t + 1) (i.e., that v 0 still is tip at time t + 1) is f (O(t)), and the Borel-Cantelli lemma 6 gives that the probability that v 0 will be eventually approved is less than 1 or equal to 1 depending on whether n f (n) converges or diverges; the convergence (divergence) of the sum is equivalent to convergence (divergence) of the integral in (3) due to the monotonicity of the function f . A standard probabilistic argument 7 would then imply that if the probability that a given tip remains orphaned forever is positive, then the probability that at least one tip remains orphaned forever is equal to 1.
One may naturally think that it would be better to choose the function f in such a way that, almost surely, every tip eventually gets confirmed. However, as explained in Section 4.1 of [17] , there is a good reason to choose a rapidly decreasing function f , because this defends the system against nodes' misbehavior and attacks. The idea is then to assume that a transaction which did not get confirmed during a sufficiently long period of time is "unlucky", and needs to be reattached 8 to the tangle. Let us fix some K > 0: it stands for the time when an unlucky transaction is reissued (because there is already very little hope that it would be confirmed "naturally"). We call a transaction issued less than K time units ago "unconfirmed", and if a transaction was issued more than K time units ago and was not confirmed, we call it "orphaned". In the following, we assume that the system is stable, in the sense that the "recent" unconfirmed transactions do not accumulate and the time until a transaction is confirmed (roughly) does not depend on the moment when it appeared in the system 9 .
In that stable regime, let p be the probability that a transaction is confirmed K time units after it was issued for the first time; the number of times a transaction should be issued to achieve confirmation is then a Geometric random variable with parameter p (and, therefore, with expected value p −1 ); so, the mean time until the 6 to be precise, a bit more refined argument is needed since the corresponding events are not independent 7 which is also not so easy to formalize in these circumstances 8 in fact, the nodes of the network may adopt a rule that prescribes to delete the transactions that are older than K and still are tips from their databases 9 simulations indicate that this is indeed the case when α is small; however, it is not guaranteed to happen for large values of α transaction is confirmed is K/p. Let us then recall the following remarkable fact belonging to the queuing theory, known as Little's formula (or theorem/identity):
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that λ a is the arrival rate, µ is the mean number of customers in the system, and T is the mean time a customer spends in the system, then T = µ/λ a .
Proof. See e.g. Section 5.2 of [6] . To understand intuitively why this fact holds true, one may reason in the following way: assume that, while in the system, each customer pays money to the system with rate 1. Then, at large time t, the total amount of money earned by the system would be (approximately) µt on one hand, and T λ a t on the other hand. Dividing by t and then sending t to infinity, we obtain µ = T λ a .
Little's formula then implies 10 the following Proposition 1.3. The mean number of unconfirmed transactions in the system is equal to p −1 λK.
In case when the tangle contains data (which, in principle, can make transactions incompatible between each other), one may choose more sophisticated methods of tip selection. As we already mentioned, selecting tips with larger values of α provides better defense against attacks and misbehavior; however, smaller values of α make the system more stable with respect to the transactions' confirmation times. An example of "mixed-α" strategy is the following. Define the "model tip" w 0 as a result of the random walk with large α, then select two tips w 1,2 with random walks with small α, but check that
is consistent.
Selfish nodes and Nash equilibria
Now, we are going to study the situation when some participants of the network are "selfish" and want to use a customized attachment strategy, in order to improve the confirmation time of their transactions (possibly at the expense of the others).
For a finite set A let us denote by M(A) the set of all probability measures on A, that is
be the union of the sets of all probability measures on the pairs of (not necessarily distinct) vertices of DAGs belonging to G. Then, an attachment strategy S is a map
; that is, for any G ∈ G with data attached to the vertices (which corresponds to the state of the tangle at a given time) there is a corresponding probability measure on the set of pairs of the vertices. Note also that in the above we considered ordered pairs of vertices, which, of course, does not restrict the generality. Let κ > 0 be a fixed number. We now assume that, for a (very) large N , there are κN nodes that follow the default tip selection algorithm, and N "selfish" nodes that try to minimize their "cost", whatever this could mean 11 . Assume that all nodes issue transactions with the same rate λ (κ+1)N , independently. The overall rate of "honest" transactions in the system is then equal to λκ κ+1 , and the overall rate of transactions issued by selfish nodes equals λ κ+1 . Let S 1 , . . . , S N be the attachment strategies used by the selfish nodes. To evaluate the "goodness" of a strategy, one has to choose and then optimize some suitable observable (that stands for the "cost"); as usual, there are several "reasonable" ways to do this. We decided to choose the following one, for definiteness and also for technical reasons (to guarantee the continuity of some function used below); one can probably extend our arguments to other reasonable cost functions. Assume that a transaction v was attached to the tangle at time
M 0 be the moments when the subsequent (after v) transactions were attached to the tangle. For k = 1 . . . , M 0 let R (v) k be the event that the default tip-selecting walk 12 on T t (v) k stops in a tip that does not reference v. We then define
to be the number of times that the M 0 "subsequent" tip selection random walks do not reference v (in the above, 1 A is the indicator function of an event A). Intuitively, the smaller is the value of W (v)/M 0 , the bigger is the chance that v is quickly confirmed.
Next, assume that (v (k) j , j ≥ 1) are the transactions issued by the kth (selfish) node. We define
to be the mean cost of the kth node given that S 1 , . . . , S N are the attachment strategies of the selfish nodes.
for any k and any S = S k .
Observe that, since the nodes are indistinguishable, the fact that (S 1 , . . . , S N ) is a Nash equilibrium implies that so is (S σ 1 , . . . , S σ(N ) ) for any permutation σ.
Naturally, we would like to prove that Nash equilibria exist. Unfortunately, we could not obtain the proof of this fact in the general case, since the space of all possible strategies is huge. Therefore, we consider the following simplifying assumption (which is, by the way, also quite reasonable since, in practice, one would hardly use the genesis as the starting vertex for the random walks due to runtime issues):
Assumption L. There is n 1 > 0 such that the attachment strategies of all nodes (including those that use the default attachment strategy) only depend on the restriction of the tangle to the last n 1 transactions that they see.
Observe that, under the above assumption, the set of all such strategies can be thought of as a compact convex subset of R d , where d = d(n 1 ) is sufficiently large. Also, observe that the set of all possible restrictions of elements of G on a subset of n 1 vertices is finite; we denote that set by G n 1 . The set of all such attachments strategies will be then denoted by M n 1 .
In this section we use a different approach to model the network propagation delays: instead of assuming that an incoming transaction does not have information about the state of the tangle during last h units of time, we rather assume that it does not have information about the last n 0 transactions attached to the tangle, where n 0 < n 1 is some fixed positive number (so, effectively, the strategies would depend on subgraphs induced by n 1 − n 0 transactions, although the results of this section do not rely on this assumption). Clearly, these two approaches are quite similar in spirit; however, the second one permits us to avoid certain technical difficulties related to randomness of the number of unseen transactions in the first case 13 .
From now on, we assume that vertices contain no data, i.e., the set D is empty; this is not absolutely necessary because, with the data, the proof will be essentially the same; however, the notations would become much more cumbersome. Also, there will be no reattachments; again, this would unnecessarily complicate the proofs (one would have to work with decorated Poisson processes). In fact, we are dealing with a so-called random-turn game here (see e.g. Chapter 9 of [13] for other examples).
To proceed, we need the following Fix θ ∈ (0, 1), denote P (s) = θP + (1 − θ) P (s), and let π s be the (unique) stationary measure of P (s). Then, the map s → π s is also continuous.
Proof. In the following we give a (rather) probabilistic proof of this fact via the Kac's lemma, although, of course, a purely analytic proof is also possible. Irreducibility and aperiodicity of P imply that, for some m 0 ∈ N and ε 0 > 0
for all x, y ∈ E. Now, (6) implies that
for all x, y ∈ E and all s ∈ F . Being (X n , n ≥ 0) a stochastic process on E, let us define τ (x) = min{k ≥ 1 : X k = x} 13 also, it will be more natural and convenient to pass from continuous to discrete time (with the convention min ∅ = ∞) to be the hitting time of the site x ∈ E by the stochastic process X. Now, let P (s)
x and E (s)
x be the probability and the expectation with respect to the Markov chain with transition matrix P (s) starting from x ∈ E. We now recall the Kac's lemma (cf. e.g. Theorem 1.22 of [7] ): for all x ∈ E it holds that π s (x) = 1
Now, (7) readily implies that, for all x ∈ E and n ∈ N,
for some positive constants c 1,2 which do not depend on s. This in its turn implies that the series
converges uniformly in s and so E (s)
x τ (x) is uniformly bounded from above 14 ; also, the Uniform Limit Theorem implies that E (s)
x τ (x) is continuous in s. Therefore, for any x ∈ E, (8) implies that π s (x) is also a continuous function of s.
Consider, for the moment, the situation when all nodes use the same (default) attachment strategy (i.e., there are no selfish nodes). The restriction of the tangle on the last n 1 transactions then becomes a Markov chain on the state space G n 1 . We now make the following technical assumption on that Markov chain:
Assumption D. The above Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
It is important to observe that Assumption D is not guaranteed to hold for every natural attachment strategy; however, still, this is not a very restrictive assumption in practice because every finite Markov chain may be turned into an irreducible and aperiodic one by an arbitrarily small perturbation of the transition matrix.
Then, we are able to prove the following Theorem 2.3. Under Assumptions L and D, the system has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The authors were unable to find a result available in the literature that implies Theorem 2.3 directly; nevertheless, its proof is quite standard and essentially follows Nash's original paper [15] (see also [9] ). There is only one technical difficulty, which we intend to address via the above preparatory steps: one needs to prove the continuity of the cost function. Denote by π S the invariant measure of the Markov chain given that the (selfish) nodes use the "strategy vector" s = (S 1 , . . . , S N ). Then, the idea is to use Lemma 2.2 with θ = κ κ+1 , P the transition matrix obtained from the default attachment strategy, and P (s) is the transition matrix obtained from the strategy S = N −1 N k=1 S k (observe that N nodes using the strategies S 1 , . . . , S N , is the same as one node with strategy S issuing transactions N times faster). Assumption D together with Lemma 2.2 then imply that π s := π S is a continuous function of s.
Let E S,Ŝ π S be the expectation with respect to the following procedure: take the "starting" graph according to π S , then attach to it a transaction according to the strategy S, and then keep attaching subsequent transactions according to the strat-egyŜ (instead of S andŜ we may also use the strategy vectors; S andŜ would be then their averages). Let also W (k) be the random variable defined as in (4) for a transaction issued by the kth node. Then, the Ergodic Theorem for Markov chains (see e.g. Theorem 1.23 of [7] ) implies that
It is not difficult to see that the above expression is a polynomial of the S's coefficients (i.e., the corresponding probabilities) and π S -values, and hence it is a continuous function on the space of strategies M n 1 . Using this, the rest of the proof is standard, it is obtained as a consequence of the Kakutani's fixed point theorem [12] (also with the help of the Berge's Maximum Theorem, see e.g. Chapter E.3 of [16] ).
Symmetric games do not always have symmetric Nash equilibria, as shown in [8] . Also, even when such equilibria exist in the class of mixed strategies, they may be "inferior" to asymmetric pure equilibria; for example, this happens in the classical "Battle of the sexes" game (see e.g. Section 7.2 of [13] ). Now, the goal is to prove that, if the number of selfish nodes N is large, then for any equilibrium state the costs of distinct nodes cannot be much different. Namely, we have the following Theorem 2.4. For any ε > 0 there exists N 0 (depending on the default attachment strategy) such that, for all N ≥ N 0 and any Nash equilibrium (S 1 , . . . , S N ) it holds that
for all k, j ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
Proof. Without restricting generality we may assume that
so we then need to proof that C (1) (s) − C (2) (s) < ε, where s = (S 1 , . . . , S N ). Now, the main idea of the proof is the following: if C (1) (s) is considerably larger than C (2) (s), then the owner of the first node may decide to adopt the strategy used by the second one. This would not necessarily decrease his costs to the (former) costs of the second node since a change in an individual strategy leads to changes in all costs; however, when N is large, the effects of changing the strategy of only one node would be small, and (if the difference of C (1) (s) and C (2) (s) were not small) this would lead to a contradiction to the assumption that s was a Nash equilibrium. So, let us denote s = (S 2 , S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S N ), the strategy vector after the first node adopted the strategy of its "more successful" friend. Let S = 1 N S 1 + · · · + S N and S = 1 N 2S 2 + S 3 + · · · + S N be the two "averaged" strategies. In the following, we are going to compare C (2) (s) = E (S 2 ,S) π S W (2) (the "old" cost of the second node) with C (1) (s ) = E (S 2 ,S ) π S W (1) (the "new" cost of the first node, after it adopted the second node's strategy). We need the following Lemma 2.5. For any measure π on G n 1 and any strategy vectors s = (S 1 , . . . , S N ) and s = (S 1 , . . . , S N ) such that S k = S k for all k = 2, . . . , N , we have
for all j = 2, . . . , N .
Proof. Let us define the event A = {among the M 0 transactions there is at least one issued by the first node}, and observe that, by the union bound, the probability that it occurs is at most M 0 /N . Then, using the fact that E
where we also used that W (j) ≤ M 0 . This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.5.
We continue proving Theorem 2.4. First, by symmetry, we have
Also, it holds that
by Lemma 2.5. Then, similarly to the proof of Theorem 2.3, we can obtain that the function
is continuous; since it is defined on a compact, it is also uniformly continuous. That is, for any ε > 0 there exist δ > 0 such that if (S, S , S ) − (S,S ,S ) < δ , then
Choose N 0 = 1/δ . We then obtain from the above that
The relations (13) , (14) , and (15) imply that
On the other hand, since we assumed that s is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that
which implies that
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.4. Now, let us define the notion of approximate Nash equilibrium:
Definition 2.6. For a fixed ε > 0, we say that a set of strategies (S 1 , . . . , S N ) is an ε-equilibrium if
The motivation for introducing this notion is that, if ε is very small, then, in practice, ε-equilibria are essentially indistinguishable from the "true" Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2.7. For any ε > 0 there exists N 0 (depending on the default attachment strategy) such that, for all N ≥ N 0 and any Nash equilibrium (S 1 , . . . , S N ) it holds that (S, . . . , S) is an ε-equilibrium, where
(that is, all selfish nodes use the same "averaged" strategy defined above). The costs of all selfish nodes are then equal to
that is, the average cost in the Nash equilibrium.
In other words, for large N one can essentially assume that all selfish nodes follow the same attachment strategy.
Proof. To begin, we observe that the proof of the second part is immediate, since, as already noted before, for an external observer, the situation where there are N nodes with strategies (S 1 , . . . , S N ) is indistinguishable from the situation with one node with averaged strategy. Now, we need to prove that, for any fixed ε > 0 it holds that
for all large enough N (the claim would then follow by symmetry). Recall that we have
and
where
Now, the second part of this theorem together with Theorem 2.4 imply 15 that, for any fixed ε > 0
for all large enough N . Next, let us denote
Then, again using the uniform continuity argument (as in the proof of Theorem 2.4), we obtain that, for any ε > 0
for all large enough N . However,
since (S 1 , . . . , S N ) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, (22)-(23) imply that
and, recalling (19) and (21), we conclude the proof of Theorem 2.7.
Simulations
In this section we investigate Nash equilibria between selfish nodes via simulations. This is motivated by the following important question: since the choice of an attachment strategy is not enforced, there may indeed be nodes which would prefer to "optimize" their strategies in order to decrease the mean confirmation time of their
T (t + ∆) Figure 2 : Why the "greedy" tip selection strategy will not work (the two "best" tips are shown as larger circles).
transactions. So, can this lead to a situation where the corresponding Nash equilibrium is "bad for everybody", effectively leading to the system's malfunctioning (again, we do not specify the exact meaning of that)? Due to Theorem 2.7 we may assume that all selfish nodes use the same attachment strategy. Even then, it is probably unfeasible to calculate that strategy exactly; instead, we resort to simulations, which indeed will show that the equilibrium strategy of the selfish nodes will not be much different from the (suitably chosen) default strategy. But, before doing that, let us explain the intuition behind this fact. Naively, a natural strategy for a selfish node would be the following:
(1) Calculate the exit distribution of the tip-selecting random walk.
(2) Find the two tips where this distribution attains its "best" 16 values.
(3) Approve these two tips.
However, this strategy fails when other selfish nodes are present. To understand this, look at Figure 2 : many selfish nodes attach their transactions to the two "best" tips. As a result, the "neighborhood" of these two tips becomes "overcrowded": there is so much competition between the transactions issued by the selfish nodes, that the chances of them being approved soon actually decrease 17 .
To illustrate this fact, several simulations have been done. All the results depicted here were generated using equation 2 as the transition probability, with q = 1/3, and with a network delay of h = 1. Also, a transaction will be reattached if the two following criteria are met.
(1) The transaction is older than 20 seconds 18
(2) The transaction is not referenced by the tip selected using the random walk with α = ∞. 19 That way, we guarantee not only that the unconfirmed transactions will be eventually confirmed, but also that all the never reattached transactions are always referenced by the majority of the tips. Note that when the reattachment is allowed in the simulations, if a new transaction references both an old reattached transaction and its new reissued one, a double spending will be done. Even though these odds are low (since when a transaction is reemitted, it will be old enough to be almost never be chosen by the random walk algorithm), a specific function was included in the simulations in order to not allow double spendings.
One dimentional Nash equilibria
In this section, we will study the Nash equilibria of the problem considering the following strategy space:
where S 0 is the default tip selection strategy, S 1 is the selfish strategy defined in the beginning of this section and θ ∈ [0, 1]. The selfish nodes are trying to optimize with respect to θ. Suppose that we have a fixed fraction γ of selfish nodes. The strategy of the non-selfish nodes will be restricted, as expected, to θ = 0. Note that they can not choose their strategy, so they will not "play" the game. This mixed strategy game is equivalent to a game where only a fraction p = γθ of the selfish nodes chooses S 1 over S 0 , and the rest of the nodes chooses S 0 over S 1 . This equivalence is possible because the mean cost function used in this simulation is linear over the strategy of the nodes. The goal is to find the Nash equilibria related to the costs defined in the last section (equations 5 and 4), with M 0 = 500 for λ = 50 and M 0 = 250 for λ = 25. This number was chosen because it is half the number of issued transactions until the reattachment criteria of a tip is met. Since different choices of M 0 will lead to a different practical meanings of the costs, these values were chosen in order to preserve this meaning even for different λ. Note that the average cost will be related to the average time of approval (indeed, the average time of approval will be approximately t 0 + W/λ, where t 0 is the expected value of the instant in which the summation in equation 4 starts). So, in both cases (λ = 25 and λ = 50), the mean cost was calculated over the transactions attached at a interval of time of approximately 10s, what makes reasonable to a real player to prefer a strategy with a low cost as defined here over a strategy with a high cost. Also, as t 0 + W/λ, if t 0 W/λ the relative gains in cost (difference between the cost of the transactions issued by selfish nodes and the cost of the transactions issued by the non-selfish nodes, as percentage) will be in the same order of magnitude of the relative gains in the confirmation time, so all the analysis of the gains in this section will be approximately the same when we look at the times of approvals. Note that Figure 3 (a) represents a typical graph of average costs of the selfish and non-selfish nodes as a function of the fraction p of the issued transactions of the strategy S 1 , for a low α and two different values of λ. Here, the Nash equilibrium will occur at the pointp, where the costs of the transactions emitted by S 0 and S 1 are the same. That point is easily found at 3(b), when δ = 0. Note that the Nash equilibrium for the larger λ will be at a smaller θ 0 than the Nash equilibrium for the smaller λ. This was already expected, since, for a larger λ/h, the tips will be naturally more "overcrowded" than for a smaller λ/h, so the effect depicted at Figure 2 will be amplified and the Nash equilibrium for the higher λ/h cases must occur with a smaller proportion of transactions issued by the pure strategy S 1 . Now, let us reconsider the mixed strategy game. In the case that all the nodes are allowed to choose between the two pure strategies (S 0 and S 1 ), the Nash equilibrium will be indeed at θ 0 =p (as expected, since in this case γ = 1). If just a fraction γ = p/θ >p of the nodes is selfish, then the Nash equilibrium will occur when θ 0 =p/γ. Now, if γ ≤p, the costs of the nodes will not coincide 20 . In that case, the average cost of a selfish node will always be smaller than the average cost of a non-selfish node, meaning that the Nash equilibrium will be met at θ 0 = 1. Summing up, the Nash equilibrium θ 0 will be met at:
.
The Figure 4 (a) represents a typical graph of average costs of the selfish and nonselfish nodes as a function of the fraction of selfish nodes, for a higher α. In that case, even though the average costs of the selfish nodes and the average cost of the non-selfish nodes do not coincide for any reasonable fraction of selfish nodes (meaning that the Nash equilibrium will be met at θ = 1), the typical gains will be low, as depicted in Figure 4(b) . Also, the difference between the average cost of a non-selfish node in a low p and in a high p is low, meaning that the presence of selfish nodes do not harm the efficiency of the non-selfish nodes. This difference is represented at Figure 5 below, for several values of α and λ. Note that this difference is small for all reasonable values of p, but even for the larger available p, the difference is less than 25%. 
Multidimentional Nash equilibria
In the same way as the last section, a game with a mixed strategy space:
where i=N i=0 θ i = 1 and {S i } i=0...N a set of strategies is equivalent to a game where the nodes must choose among the simple strategies S i . That means all the possible strategies must have the same cost in order to the game reach some equilibrium. In this case, in order to simplificate the data, the studied object was the probability of a given tip to be chosen by the selfish nodes and the non-selfish nodes. These studied tips were ordered by the random walk exit probability, from the most probable to the least probable. Figure 8 represents the typical probability profile for the selfish and non-selfish nodes. The typical gain of the selfish nodes and the increase of the non-selfish nodes average cost due to the presence of selfish nodes are both small; in our simulations they were always less than 10% (3.615% for the maximum gain and 7.0% for the maximum of the cost increase of the non-selfish nodes induced by the selfish ones, comparing all parameters of λ and α)
Conclusions and future work
In the first part of this paper, we prove the existence of ("almost symmetric") Nash equilibria for a game in the tangle where a part of players tries to optimize their attachment strategies. In the second part of the paper, we numerically determine, for a simple space strategy and some range of parameters, where these equilibria are located.
Our results show that the studied selfish strategy outperform the non-selfish ones by a reasonable order of magnitude. The data show a 25% (in the most extreme scenario) difference in the nodes gains, which in some situations, may be large enough. Nevertheless, the computational cost of the selfish strategy is intrinsically larger than the computational cost of the non-selfish strategies, since the selfish strategy uses the probability distribution of the tips, which is quite hard to find when using a random walk with backtracking. They will also have to monitor the tangle, to know its parameters (like λ, h etc) and act accordingly. Also, even a extreme scenario, where almost half of the transactions were issued by a selfish node, is not enough to harm the non-selfish ones in a meaningful way.
On the other hand, our results raise further questions. The obtained data exhibit a deep qualitative dependence on the parameter α of the simulation. This parameter is related to the randomness of the random walk (a low α implies a high randomness; a higher α implies a low randomness, meaning that the walk will be almost deterministic). Further simulations will be done in order to study the effect of that variable in the equilibria. Also, we only studied equilibria for a given cost, relative to the probability of confirmation of the transactions in a certain interval of time. Since this probability depends heavily on the interval of time chosen (because the probability distribution of the confirmations is far from uniform), another time intervals (that will have another practical meaning) must be analysed.
Finally, the equilibrium in the multidimensional strategy space should be studied in a more quantitative and analytic way, since it should depend strongly on α and p; and until now it was studied in just a narrow range of parameters. Further research will also be done in order to optimize the default tip selection strategy in a way that minimizes this cost imposed by the selfish strategies.Through implementing research methods and techniques from the cross-reactive fields of measure theory, game theory, and graph theory, progress towards resolving the tangle-related open problems has been well under way and will continue to be under investigation.
